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Abstract: The bivalent logic usually performed in the economic discipline and thinking seems be 
unsatisfactorily because in the social field almost all the actions are based on teleology, i.e. on the 
goals. Consequently, the paper discusses a proposal to introduce tetravalent logics in the social field 
(so, in the economic one), that exhibits four truth values. In this context, the paper develops some 
considerations regarding the conceptual and methodological issues associated with the tetravalent 
logics proposal. 
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1. General Framework 
We consider that the following g coordinates should underlie a possible solution to 
clarify the matter of truth in economy (broader, within the social field): 
 In economy (broader, within the social field), due to the presence of the subject 
within the structure of the economic phenomenon/process, the purpose is the 
dominant cause of any such phenomenon/process. For the moment, we are not 
interested whether this purpose is individual or not, whether it is decided at the 
individual level or not. As shown, the economic phenomenon/process doesn‘t exist 
per se; rather it is generated by the decision, the action of the subject (all the 
economic phenomena/processes being artefacts)
2
; 
 The immediate consequence of the previous trait is that the prescriptive 
statements are dominant in economy. By prescriptive statement we understand a 
statement or assertion which indicates goals or procedures/means to reach the  
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2 Hence, in the economic (social) field, the future doesn‘t come, rather it is built; it is not emergent, 
rather planned (even if the matter of the future as intellectual project has yet to wait until approached 
within this paper). 
AUDŒ, Vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 190-203 
ŒCONOMICA 
191 
goals
1
. The prescriptive statements are, like the predictive statements, prior to the 
relevant factual, but they don‘t refer just the factual itself, like the predictive 
statements, but rather concomitantly to the factual, to the subject and to its action to 
generate the factual. The formal presentation of the two categories of statements 
(predictive, and prescriptive) might look like this: 
  : concerned factual; 
    : moment when the prescriptive or predictive statement about the concerned 
factual is formulated; 
   : moment when the factual concerned by the prescriptive or predictive 
statement occurs; 
   : moment when the descriptive statement is formulated; 
          : time arrow condition; 
   : actual factual; 
  ̇  : factual concerned by the predictive statement; 
  ̈  : factual concerned by the prescriptive statement; 
  ̉ : factual concerned by the descriptive statement; 
    : predictive statement;  
    : prescriptive statement;  
   : descriptive statement.  
We might then have the following formal presentations (which we will 
subsequently use): 
   ( )   (     ̇  ) 
   ( )   (     ̈  ) 
  ( )   (    ̉ ) 
 Based on the first two explanations, we can now make the third one: in the 
economic field (broadly, in the social field), the correspondence-truth is not 
relevant because the economic factual is not described by predictive statements, 
rather by prescriptive statements. Within this context, the descriptive statement 
                                                          
1 In terms of semiotics, such statements are of the same type as Austin‘s perlocutionary statements 
(statements which change the situation within the context of their formulation; for instance, 
Habermas‘ concept of communicative action is a species of perlocutionary statement, because it 
aspires to change the polemic stance of the interlocutor). 
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doesn‘t inform about the factual only, but about three elements too: a) the factual 
itself; b) the subject which h issued the prescriptive statement which, most times, at 
the individual, collective or representative levels, is the same with the subject 
which generates the prescribed factual; c) the action which led to the appearance of 
the factual
1
; on this basis, the formal description above concerning the prescriptive 
statements and the descriptive statements associated to them, will change as 
follows: 
   ( )   (     ̈          [    ]
    [    ]), where: 
    : deciding subject (or normative subject);   [    ]
 : actional subject as it is set 
by the normative subject;   [    ]: the action required (normed) to turn objective 
factual  ̈  . 
  ( )   (    ̉    [    ]
        [    ]), where: 
  [    ]
 : actual actional subject (or praxeological subject);    : evaluating subject 
(or observing subject);   [    ]: action accomplished (implemented) which 
produced factual   . 
 Therefore, in the economic field, testing the ―truth‖ is done by comparing 
the prescriptive and descriptive statements, as they were described above: 
   ( )    ( ), or  
 (     ̈            
    [    ])   (    ̉    [    ]
        [    ]), where: 
 : our choice of noting the logic constant is compared with. 
 Due to the complex character of the economic system/process (generated by the 
structural presence of the subject), any prescriptive statement will have two 
components: an eutaxiological one, aimed to capture, within the economic process, 
the necessary type of causality
2
, and a teleological one, aimed to capture the 
contingent type of causality (in our case, the causality based on purpose). We may 
accept
3
 that we have a linear overlapping of these two types of causality. If we 
                                                          
1 Here, the expression appearance of the factual must not be taken ad litteram, because in the 
economic field, as mentioned before several times, the factuals don‘t emerge, rather are objectivised 
by the decision and, subsequently, by the action of the subject. 
2 Although the proportion of the eutaxiological causality still is very small within the economy 
(broadly, within the social field), there is, however, what we call an intra-contingent necessity, which 
overlaps this type of causality (for instance, the exhaustion of the fossil resources is a necessity within 
a process decided within a contingent manner). 
3 We are using here an analogy with the situation from the quantic mechanics of the linear 
overlapping of the potential states of a quantic object before proceeding to an experiment with that 
object. The accomplishment of the experiment collapses the wave function which describes the state 
of the quantic object, so that the observer (the scientist) notices a unique state. Although the 
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describe a prescription based on this linear overlapping as:    ( )        
 , where   is the eutaxiological component, and   is the teleological component, 
while   and   are weighing coefficients (   , and      ), then, a 
prescriptive statement can be represented as in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Linear overlapping within the structure of the prescriptive statement 
The prescriptive statement will thus have the following formulation: 
 (     ̇    ̈            
    [    ])  
     (     ̇            
    [    ])       (     ̈            
    [    ]) 
The descriptive statement will thus have the following formulation: 
 (    ̉    [    ]
        [    ])
     (    ̉    [    ]
        [    ])    
  (    ̉    [    ]
        [    ]) 
As    depends on     (the proportion ―allocated‖ to normativity in developing the 
prescriptive statement introduces restrictions for the accomplishment of 
eutaxiology when the factual occurs, therefore within the linear structure of the 
descriptive statement), we may write: 
 (    ̉    [    ]
    [    ])  
  (   )   (    ̉    [    ]
        [    ])    
  (    ̉    [    ]
        [    ]) 
                                                                                                                                                   
collapsing method used to explain the transition from the quantic state to its macroscopic description 
is rather unsatisfactory, it remains, nevertheless, an explicative alternative until ne suppositions 
emerge. 
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Purely theoretically, and simplifying the algebraic formulations just with an 
illustrative role, we may have the following cases of the prescriptive statement, 
depending on the values taken by coefficients   and   (Figure 2): 
          
   vs. 
    
   (     ̈          [    ]) 
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Figure 2. Theoretical cases of prescriptive statements 
 Cases 1 and 4: pure phenomenological predictive statements (exclusively 
eutaxiological). 
- For instance: predictions regarding the evolution of the fossil fuel reserves. 
 Cases 7, 8 and 10: pure normative prescriptive statements (exclusively 
teleological). 
- For instance: prescribing (norming) the maximal public budget deficit. 
 Cases 6 and 9: impossibility (or uselessness) of formulating prescriptive 
statements in economy. 
 Cases 2, 3 and 5: standard prescriptive statements, relying on the linear 
overlapping between eutaxiological and teleological. 
- For instance: prescribing the annual inflation (average or at the end of the year), 
or prescribing the nominal exchange rate. 
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2. Concept of “truth” in Economy 
It is strongly recommended that the paper should have an even number of pages, 
but no longer than 4 to 14 pages. In some cases papers with more than 14 pages 
will be accepted by the editorial board if they contain the report of a wider research 
activity which can not appear separated in two papers. 
2.1. Four Values of Occurrence
1
 in the Economic Field 
Let us see how must be done the comparison between the prescriptive and the 
descriptive statements and how to decide on the ―truth‖ of the prescriptive 
statement.  
First, we set, within the new framework of the discussion, the differences between 
the predictive and the prescriptive statements. This is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Cases of predictions, prescriptions and presdictions 
NB: the term invented by us for the present necessities – presdictions – signifies 
the linear overlapping of predictions and prescriptions, when eutaxiological or 
teleological causalities also appear concomitantly. 
Second, remember that we have to compare three entities which can be found, at 
the particular moments of time, both in the prescriptive statement, and in the 
descriptive statement
2
: 1) the factual itself; b) the subject which issued the 
prescriptive statement; c) the action which caused the appearance of the factual. 
                                                          
1 We prefer to replace the term of truth with the term of occurrence. The justification of this action 
lies in the higher possibility to persist, in our memory, the significance of the correspondence-truth 
when we are discussing about the concept of truth as such. As it resulted from several arguments 
presented so far, the correspondence-truth has no relevance for the economic field. Therefore, when 
we will approach the matter of the tables of truth, we will call them tables of occurrence. 
2 We are ignoring the fact that the prescriptive statement contains, many times, eutaxiological 
causality too (that is, cases when    , using the notation used above). This disregarding doesn‘t 
compromise the generality of our considerations, although technically, in this disregarded case we 
will have two ―modules‖ to analyse: a) the eutaxiological module, for which the eutaxiological 
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- For the factual:  ̈    ̉ ; 
- For the subject:        [    ]
 ;        [    ]
 ;         ;   [    ]
  
  [    ]
 ;  
  [    ]
     ;   [    ]
     ; 
- For the action:   [    ]    [    ]. 
Therefore, unlike the standard case (for instance, that of the correspondence-truth), 
this time we don‘t just compare semantically the content of the prescriptive and 
descriptive statements (in terms of the coincidence of denotations signified by each 
of the two statements); rather we also check the two ―coincidences‖: between the 
involved subjects and between the involved actions. 
Third, we consider, relying on what we have already shown, that in the economic 
field (broadly, in the social field) it is necessary that the bivalent logics, with two 
truth values – true (A) and false (F) – which is compatible with the 
correspondence-truth (inadequate, irrelevant and impossible to verify because, in 
this field, we almost don‘t have predictive statements) – must be replaced by 
tetravalent logics
1
, with four ―truth‖ values:  
1.  : nominal accomplishment, ―with no rest‖, of the prescribed purpose;  
2.  ̅ : nominal missing of the purpose
2
, however, accompanied by unintentional
3
 
consequences, convenient to the subject; 
3.   : nominal accomplishment of the purpose, but accompanied by unintentional 
consequences, non-convenient to the subject; 
4.  ̅: nominal missing, ―with no rest‖, of the purpose. 
One may notice the following issues regarding this proposal: 
a. We don‘t raise the issue of the discrete levels of accomplishing the purpose, 
because that would lead to logics with an infinite and countable multitude of values 
(polyvalent logics); we also don‘t raise the issue of the continuous levels of 
purpose accomplishment, because it would lead to logics with an infinite and 
                                                                                                                                                   
component plays a role of predictive statement; b) the teleological module, for which the teleological 
component plays the role of normative statement. 
1 For instrumental reasons, we propose to call this possible logics: 4         . 
2 The negation sign ( ̅) has the same significance as in the classical logics, which allows formulating 
the principle of identity (   ), the principle of non-contradiction (   ̅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ), and the principle of the 
excluded third party (   ̅). 
3 The concept of unintended consequence has been highly theorized by Karl Popper, who was saying 
that the most important task of the social sciences is to make predictions about the unintended 
consequences of the taken decisions.  
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uncountable multitude of values (fuzzy logics); therefore, the purpose is either 
accomplished, or unaccomplished, only that for each of these cases we introduce 
the possibility that the accomplishment or unaccomplishment is accompanied by 
unintended consequences with opposite significance: non-convenient to the subject 
(nominal accomplishment, ―with rest‖, of the purpose), or convenient to the subject 
(nominal missing, ―with rest‖, of the purpose). 
b.  The nominal missing, ―with rest‖, of the purpose is not equivalent with the 
partial accomplishment (therefore with a partial level of accomplishment of the 
purpose) because the convenient unintentional consequences, by definition, are not 
part of the purpose; similarly, the nominal accomplishment, ―with rest‖, of the 
purpose is not equivalent with the full (more precise, accurate) unaccomplishment 
of the purpose, because the non-convenient unintentional consequences, by 
definition, are not part of the purpose 
c. Applying Karl Popper‘s suggestion to make predictions about the unintended 
consequences of our decisions leads, in terms of logics, in our opinion, to the 
classical prediction: indeed, an unintended consequence, not being part of a 
purpose (case in which it would become intended), it can‘t have a contingent 
character, rather a necessary one; therefore, it will not submit to the teleological 
causality, rather to an eutaxiological causality. However, as seen in Figure 14, such 
situation can only be dealt with using predictions; 
d. We will also notice that we have no less than six comparative situations 
regarding the subject involved in the matter of the economic truth, while in the case 
of predictions (the correspondence-truth) the subject doesn‘t appear neither in the 
predictive statement, nor in the descriptive statement, because we only have 
eutaxiological causality generated by necessity. 
e. The two values of truth in the cases ―with rest‖ are generated by the fact that, in 
the economic field, the normative subject (  ) can differ from the actional subject 
(  ) and from the evaluating subject (  ). Here are the possible situations: 
(1)               
 (     ̈      
      [    ])   (    ̉    
      [    ]) (NB: the sign   has the 
significance of identical or equivalent): therefore, in this case we have only two 
elements to compare: a)  ̈    ̉ ; b)   [    ]    [    ]; we may formulate this 
comparison as follows: the prescribed factual is compared to the produced factual
1
 
under the conditions in which the prescribed action is compatible with the actual 
action. But what does it actually mean that the prescribed action is compatible with 
the actual action? Here are some considerations: 
                                                          
1 A more exact term, which to replace produced is accomplished, because, as already shown, the 
economic factuals are always artefacts; they don‘t appear or are produced, rather they are 
accomplished by the subject. 
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− First, what does it mean that all the three involved subjects are identical (or 
equivalent, more generally)? It means, of course, that all subjects aim the same 
purpose, which means that we have the following expectation:  ̈       ̉   . 
Of course, the equivalence of the subjects doesn‘t involve their ontological 
identity: this means that the three subjects may be ontologically different
1
 (each of 
them is a different person) but praxeologically equivalent (have the same purpose, 
each in terms of his ―role‖: prescribing the purpose, accomplishing the purpose, 
evaluating the accomplished purpose). In order to suggest in a formal manner too 
this difference between the ontological equivalence and the praxeological 
equivalence, we will adjust the above notation as follows: 
 ontological equivalence:   ⃖   ; 
 praxeological equivalence:      . 
On the other hand, the subjects can be ontologically identical, but praxeologically 
different. This situation occurs when the initial conditions of the subjects change 
either in the temporal interval [    ], i.e., between the time of formulating the 
prescription and the time of accomplishing the action, or in the temporal interval 
fie [   ], between the time of accomplishing the action and the moment of 
evaluating its result. In terms of our scientific interest, important is the 
praxeological equivalence of the subjects, not their ontological equivalence
2
; 
- Second, it is obvious that the prescribed factual is the very purpose, therefore 
comparison  ̈    ̉  tells us whether the purpose has been accomplished or not; 
− Third, from comparison   [    ]    [    ] we should find out whether 
unintended consequences appeared after   [    ]; in our opinion, if the three 
involved subjects are praxeologically equivalent, the prescribed action will be 
identical (or equivalent, in terms of significance) with the accomplished action, 
namely   [    ]    [    ]; 
− Fourth, therefore, the compatibility between the prescribed action and the 
accomplished action (actual action) means that the two stances of the action 
(prescribed and actual) have the same significance for the evaluating subject. 
(2)                                
 (     ̈      
     [    ])   (    ̉        [    ]): in this case we have a 
praxeological equivalence between the normative subject and the actional subject, 
                                                          
1 The expression ontological difference involved by the reasoning of this study has, of course, nothing 
to do with the complicated concept of ontological difference (distinction being/person-
being/existence) discussed by Heidegger. We hope we didn‘t confuse our scrupulous readers. 
2 Nevertheless, from other perspectives (social, political etc.) the ontological identity (equivalence) of 
the subjects is also relevant.  
ŒCONOMICA 
199 
but the evaluating subject is different from the two subjects. The comparison 
between the prescriptive statement and the descriptive statement is also done for 
two components of the two statements, a)  ̈    ̉ , and b)    [    ]    [    ], 
but there is the possibility that  ̈    ̉  because of the different evaluation of 
  [    ], or of   [    ]. Therefore, we may have here the following sub-cases: 
  ̈   ̂  ̉  (where  ̂ denotes the situation ―with rest‖, convenient, which 
accompanies the logical constant  ), showing that the prescribed (normed) purpose 
was not accomplished, but unintended consequences, convenient for the evaluating 
subject
1
 appear; formally, we have a situation of the type  ̅ ; 
  ̈   ̌  ̉  (where  ̂ denotes the situation ―with rest‖, non-convenient, which 
accompanies the logical constant  ), showing that the prescribed (normed) purpose 
was accomplished, but unintended consequences, non-convenient for the 
evaluating subject appear; formally, we have a situation of the type   ; 
  ̈    ̉ : the prescribed (normed) purpose is accomplished, ―with no rest‖; 
although the normative subject is different praxeologically (but possibly equivalent 
ontologically
2
) from the evaluating subject, we cannot exclude the situation in 
which the two have the same evaluation about the accomplishment of the 
prescribed purpose; formally, we have a situation of the type  ; 
  ̈    ̉ : the prescribed (normed) purpose is not accomplished, ―with no 
rest‖; formally, we have a situation of the type  ̅; 
(3)                                
 (     ̈      
     [    ])   (    ̉    
     [    ]): in this case we have a 
praxeological equivalence between the normative subject and the evaluating 
subject, and a difference between them in relation to the actional subject. Similarly 
to the above situation, the differences in accomplishing the purpose (leading to the 
same four situations as those described at pct. (2) above) are generated by the fact 
that the actional subject, being different both from the normative subject and from 
the evaluating subject, can implement an action which deviates from the normed 
action, namely   [    ]    [    ]; 
(4)                                
 (     ̈          [    ])   (    ̉    
     [    ]): in this case we have a 
praxeological equivalence between the actional subject and the evaluating subject, 
as well as a difference between the two on the one hand, and the normative subject, 
                                                          
1 Which, of course, may not have the same significance for the prescriptive (normative) subject, or 
may even not exist for it (meaning that the purpose is accomplished ―with no rest‖). 
2 The praxeological non-equivalence concomitant with the ontological equivalence can be also 
explained by the Oedipus effect. 
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on the other hand. The possible consequences are, again, the four situations which 
we already analysed, because, although the evaluating subject and the actional 
subject can ―agree‖ on the implemented action, therefore about the 
accomplishment of the purpose, and on the unintentional consequences that 
occurred by the implementation of that particular action, the normative subject may 
have a different ―opinion‖. 
Based on types of occurrence we may now state the types of statements. 
We have seen that in the economic (more generally, social) field, almost all 
statements fall into two categories: a) prescriptive statements
1
 ( ); and b) 
descriptive statements –  ( ). In terms of their form, these statements are function 
of five variables: moment of formulation, involved subjects (two in each case), 
purpose and action (see paragraph 3.9.1). We may strike out the time variable, 
because it is decided that the prescriptive statement will be formulated before the 
accomplishment of the action associated to the prescribed purpose, while the 
descriptive statement will be formulated after the accomplishment of that action. 
We may also remove the variable referring to the action because we may presume 
that the differences between the prescribed action and the actually accomplished 
action are preserved in the differences between the prescribed purpose and the 
actually accomplished purpose (of course, only nominally, because the differences 
between the prescribed purpose and the actually accomplished purpose are of a 
different nature than the differences between the prescribed action and the 
accomplished action). We may also remove the variable referring to the actional 
subject, because the differences between the prescribed actional subject and the 
actual actional subject can also be found (nominally, too) within the differences 
between the prescribed purpose and the accomplished purpose. Therefore, 
according to the previous notations, the two types of statements have the following 
form: 
 Prescriptive statement:   (    ̈); 
 Descriptive statement:   (    ̉). 
All the four occurrence values proposed earlier ( ,  ̅ ,   ,  ̅) are possible because 
of the differences between  ̈ and  ̉, correlated with (forcing the language we might 
also say: generated by) the praxeological differences between    and   2. 
                                                          
1 In some cases, they will be of a mixed type: predictive-prescriptive, that is, what we earlier named 
presdictive (or presdictions). 
2 The reader has already learned that the differences between the two categories of subjects are 
praxeological differences, namely differences of design and evaluation of the purpose. Although it is 
not impossible that the two subjects also are ontologically different (i.e., different natural persons), we 
are only interested in the praxeological differences.  
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We will no give names to the statements of 4  logics, as they verify the 
occurrence values (Table 1). 
Table 1. Typology of statements within 4  logics 
Value of occurrence Type of statement
1
 
  Performative statement ( [ ]) 
 ̅  
Convenient, non-performative statement 
( [ ̅ ]) 
   
Non-convenient performative statement 
( [  ̅]) 
 ̅ Non-performative statement ( [ ̅]) 
2.2. Significance of the Values of Occurrence  
It is obvious that the significance of the occurrence values proposed in 4  logics, 
which we find adequate to the economic field (otherwise, broadly, to the social 
field) is no longer related to the correspondence-truth concept, specific to the 
natural field. In conclusion of this chapter we would like to make some comments 
on the significance of the prescriptive statements
2
 associated to the values of 
occurrence. 
 Performative statement ( [ ]). The value of occurrence of this prescriptive 
statement a is noted with  . A performative statement signifies that the purpose 
prescribed within it has been accomplished through the action associated to that 
purpose. Furthermore, this statement ―specifies‖ that no unintended consequences3 
                                                          
1 This typology of the statements refer, of course, to the prescriptive statements, after they were tested 
by comparing them with the associated descriptive statements (the same procedure as for the values 
of truth from the classical bivalent logics, where the typology of the statements made reference to the 
predictive statements, after they were tested by comparison with the associated descriptive 
statements). 
2 Actually, prescriptive statements can also be found in the natural domain, but they are conditional 
prescriptive statements, while in the economic field, the prescriptive statements are unconditional. A 
prescriptive statement is conditional if the involved norm depends on (is function of) the occurrence 
some random condition(s) stipulated by that specific norm, and is unconditional if no such conditions 
are stipulated. Usually, the conditional prescriptions are called instructions of procedures (they are of 
the following general form: ―if condition x occurs, then act in manner y‖ or, ―if you aim x result, then 
act in manner y‖, etc.). on the contrary, the unconditional prescriptions are of the following general 
form: ―you have to act in manner x‖ or ―you have to do this or that‖, etc. Grammatically, we may also 
have formulations such as ―this or that objective is to be accomplished‖ or, ―this or that action is to be 
carried out‖, or even more vaguely ―this or that phenomenon will have the following evolution…‖. 
Although no imperatives appear explicitly in the latter three types of formulations (―must to‖, ―have 
to‖, etc.), these imperatives are implicit because, as mentioned several times before, they cannot take 
existence unless being accomplished by the subject. 
3 The problem of evaluating the unintended consequences while accomplishing a purpose is not that 
simple. Logically, the assessment of the appearance or not appearance of consequences beyond the 
purpose can not be done unless there is a benchmark. But the prescriptive statement expresses no such 
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appeared while accomplishing the purpose, therefore this was done ―with no rest‖. 
Purely analogically, this type of statements corresponds to the type of true 
statements from the bivalent logics; 
 Convenient, non-performative statement ( [ ̅ ]). The value of occurrence of this 
prescriptive statement a is noted with  ̅ . A convenient, non-performative 
statement signifies (by the term non-performative) that the prescribed purpose has 
not been accomplished; however, some consequences unintended by the normative 
subject were produced, which are convenient to the evaluating subject (by the term 
convenient). We have two things to notice here: a) the unintended consequences 
must also be convenient for the normative subject, because the attribute of 
convenient also bears on the prescriptive statement, which has been formulated by 
the normative subject; b) the unintended convenient consequences don‘t mean a 
partial accomplishment of the purpose, but they merely, and unavoidably, 
accompany the unfulfillment of the purpose. The suggestion of benefit associated 
to a failure cannot be circumvented here
1
. Purely analogically, this type of 
statements corresponds to the types of statements from the bivalent logics; 
 Non-convenient performative statement ( [  ̅]). The value of occurrence of this 
prescriptive statement a is noted with   . A non-convenient performative 
statement signifies (by the term performative), that the prescribed purpose has been 
accomplished and that consequences unintended by the normative subject were 
produced during the process, which are non-convenient to the evaluating subject 
(shown by the term non-convenient). Same as before, there are two things to 
notice: a) the unintended consequences must be non-convenient to the normative 
subject too, because the attribute of non-convenient bears on the prescriptive 
statement formulated by the normative subject; b) the unintended non-convenient 
consequences don‘t mean a partial failure of the purpose, but they merely, and 
unavoidably, accompany the accomplishment of the purpose. The suggestion of 
transaction cost associated to a performance cannot be circumvented here
2
. Purely 
analogically, this type of statements has no correspondent in the types of 
statements from the bivalent logics  
                                                                                                                                                   
consequences. Would they have been expressed, they would no longer be unintended, thus being part 
of the purpose. We revert thus to the initial problem, not having a benchmark to evaluate the 
unintended consequences. The situation ―worsens‖ further when praxeologically,         . 
1 This is an idea to be developed subsequently, because it seems to us that it has a great explanative 
potential for the process of evaluating the human action in general.  
2 The concept of cost of transaction is well known to the economists: that cost (not necessarily 
monetary) which accompanies any transaction (here, the term of transaction is taken in its most 
general meaning, of voluntary, inter-subject, interaction), and it ads to the price of the transaction. 
Therefore, we have a price of transaction (  ), we have a cost of transaction (  ) and we have a 
transactional price (  ), so that:         . NB:    must be recalculated in units equivalent with 
those used to measure    (for instance, in monetary units). 
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 Non-performative statement ( [ ̅]). The value of occurrence of this prescriptive 
statement a is noted with  ̅. A non-performative statement signifies that the 
prescribed purpose has not been accomplished through the action associated to that 
purpose. Furthermore, this statement ―specifies‖ that no unintended consequences 
appeared while trying to accomplish that purpose, therefore this was done ―with no 
rest‖.  
Purely analogically, this type of statements corresponds to the type of false 
statements from the bivalent logics. 
  
